

The problem of fictional entities is, without doubt, one of the most vibrant debates in contemporary philosophy. It constitutes a cardinal topic within the philosophy of fiction and has been at the center of numerous hot debates. Philosophers of fiction tackle questions that go well beyond the ordinary discourse about fiction. Literary critics raise questions about characters, plot, themes, setting, point of view and other similar aspects that compose the literary text as a literary work. These are all questions that are contained in the relevant fiction and can usually be exhausted with data from the text. Philosophers look for different problems in fiction and usually problematize aspects that are taken for granted in literary criticism. The following are some of the most important questions that philosophers ask about fictional entities: What is the ontological status of a fictional entity (does it exist or not? And if it does, how does it exist, in space-time or outside space-time? Is it an artifact or a purely intentional entity? etc.) What is the essence of a fictional entity? Can a fictional entity cause or change anything in reality? As with every philosophical problem, there is a wide range of theories that attempt to answer the aforementioned questions. In my research project, I am, first and foremost, interested in the approaches of contemporary analytic philosophers (e.g., Amy Thomasson, Alberto Voltolini), who have written substantially about various problems pertinent to fictional entities. In the context of this philosophy, I research the solutions provided by Roman Ingarden. Ingarden has developed one of the most detailed and subtle ontologies of fictional entities and literary works. His book, *On the Literary Work of Art*, is considered by some to be a breakthrough in the dispute over the status of fiction. In Ingarden's doctrine, a fictional entity is a purely intentional object. All properties that such an object possesses exist in it, due to the fact that they are *ascribed* to it in the conscious acts of the author. These acts of ascription (such as: let Sherlock be an Englishman, a detective, etc.) lead to the creation of a fictional entity, which thus begins to exist, although it is permanently dependent on the author and, following its creation, on the readers who are able to intentionally grasp the meaning of the linguistic expressions, in which the information about a fictional being is *encoded*. Due to the fact that a fictional object possesses properties in this way, and is dependent on consciousness and language, the fictional object in question exists in a specific manner: it is neither real (spatiotemporal) nor ideal, nor merely mental (it does not exist in the mind). Such a subtle concept of fictional entities avoids some of the problems present in the analytical philosophy of fiction, which oscillates between assigning them the status of Platonic entities and considering them as artifacts.